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Abstract 
This study aimed at understanding, analyzing and explaining the stand of both Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia towards Baghdad Alliance. The research revealed the fact that Baghdad 
Alliance, under the control of Britain, divided the Arabs into supporters and opposers of it. 
Iraq was one of the first countries to join it and encouraged others to do the same, especially 
Jordan, the fact which put Jordan in the middle of conflict. An opposing Arab front was 
formed which consisted of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The first considered it as a threat to its 
leading position in the Arab World, while the other considered it as a point of strength to its 
enemies in Iraq and Jordan. Therefore, they both sought to oppose the alliance by sharing 
roles. Egypt took the informational role to influence the Arabs’ public opinion, while Saudi 
Arabia took the funding role to establish opposing popular and political fronts, the fact which 
led to its failure, paving the way for the United States to take Britain’s place through 
Eisenhower’s Project. 
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Introduction: 
This study is important because it investigated one of the Western alliances, namely, 
Baghdad Alliance in light of the world conflict situation about the region of influence and 
domination, and the political circumstances which encountered the alliance.  
 
Study Problem: 
 One of the most important results of the Second World War was the split of the world 
into two camps: Western and Eastern, the fact which led to the breakout of a cold war 
between them, in which each camp sought to extend its political and intellectual influence in 
the World. Baghdad Alliance was one of the phenomena of that cold war, which stemmed 
from an American initiative. It was carried out by British planning and implementation, 
through which it sought to maintain its interests and influence in the region. 
 
Aims of the Study: 
 This study aimed at investigating the beginnings and justifications which urged the 
United States, Britain and some countries in the Middle East to take part in political and 
military alliances. The study concentrated on the search for the justifications which were 
behind the Jordanian, Saudi and Egyptian stand toward the alliance. 
 
Beginnings And Justifications of the Alliance: 
 Baghdad Alliance started as an idea of the Western countries in 1951 to establish an 
alliance which included the great states and a great possible number of the countries of the 
region. After Egypt’s abolishment of the Alliance Treaty in 1951 and Collective Defense held 
with Britain in1963, the Western countries presented a project which aimed at establishing a 
collective military organization to defend the Middle East (Mukalled,
 
1979, p. 241), to 
internationally isolate the Soviet Union and to limit its influence in it ( Abdulfattah, 1981, 
p.303.). 
 On October 14, 1951, the United States, Britain and France issued a statement in 
which the Arab countries were asked to participate in the Middle East Defense Organization 
and put their military bases, ports and transport routes under the control of the Commander 
General of the region. It was followed by a second statement of the three countries on 
November 10, 1951 to exercise pressure on the Arab countries in order to join the American 
Projects stating that “defending the Middle East is a vital issue for the free world (Al-
Hamdani, 2004, p.270). 
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 In 1952, the British Prime Minister presented a paper about the International British 
Strategy which included the justifications for the concern about the Middle East Region, the 
most important of which were: the existence of political conventions and British 
commitments with some regional countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and the Arab Gulf 
countries. It sought to restore its political and military influence in the Middle East Region by 
holding alliances with regional countries, which were considered unabandonable spheres of 
influence (Al-Shalabi, 2006, P. 159) by replanning its policies in the Middle East (Al-
Tarawnah, 2004, P. 150). 
 The importance of the region, had a role in increasing justifications. The region 
represents the centre of the Islamic world, which means that the Alliance of Britain with the 
countries of the region could give a kind of incentive for the co-operation of the rest of the 
other Islamic countries with Britain. There were also other aims represented in cutting off the 
way of the colonial Soviet aspirations in Al-Dardanil, as well as the great economic and 
political importance of the Middle East countries. Egypt is especially important because of its 
geographic location and the special strategic position of Suez Canal ( Ruane, Mar., 2005, PP 
181-182).  
 Those British aspirations were not confined to the Western countries, but they were 
met positively by the Iraqi government, looking forward to building a regional alliance in the 
region which could guarantee sovereignty and leadership. Following the assassination of 
King Abdullah I of Jordan on 20 July, 1951, the Iraqi call for annexing Jordan to Iraq was 
intensified. This attitude was confirmed on July 23, 1951 when the Iraqi minister for foreign 
affairs, Salih Jabr, suggested to the British commissioner Frederick Pride the idea of unifying 
both Hashemite thrones under the leadership of King Faissal the second.  
 In his attempt to implement this project and to influence the decision of Jordanian 
Parliament, the Iraqi government formed a committee to circulate the idea of this unity, 
which he called the unity of unifying Iraq and Jordan. It started its job in August, 1951 by 
supporting the candidates backing the unity project between both countries. However, the 
results of elections brought out representatives who were non-supportive  of this unity. King 
Talal also refused the project after taking over his constitutional authorities and being 
nominated a king by the House of Representatives. King Talal believed that Abdulilah, the 
throne Regent of Iraq sought to overthrow him in an attempt to take his place (Al-Shalabi, 
PP. 107-110). 
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 Moreover, Iraq wanted to strengthen its political influence in the region because the 
Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Sa’eed and his government were concerned about the 
possibility of a Soviet attack on Iraq (Al-Sa'eed, PP. 13-14). 
 In March, 1953 and in an attempt to form the alliance, the American Minister for 
foreign Affairs, John Foster Dallass started his visits to the Arab Region. He warned the 
leaders of the region of the existence of a danger threatening the region, represented in 
Communism. One of the suggestions was the institution of an alliance to defend the Middle 
East, confirming the support of the United States of that alliance. Britain found the alliance as 
a substitute for the treaties signed with some Arab Countries (Daradkah, PP 76-77). 
 John Foster Dallass- during his tour in the region- had a meeting with president Jamal 
Abdulnassir to circulate the project of instituting “the Organization of Middle East Defense”. 
But Abdulnassir refused the offer saying that: “such projects do not serve the countries of the 
region, do not reflect them, but they will make them countries following the great countries’ 
aspirations and policies (Abdulfattah, PP. 331-332). 
 Dallass continued his visits to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Greece and Libya. He returned to his country in May, 1953 carrying an impression of 
the existence of  two specific sides in the Middle East Region: The first conformed with the 
West, and the other opposed the West. He stated that the countries supportive of the alliance 
were Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan (Al-Hamdani, P. 402). 
 The alliance was signed in Baghdad (Abdulfattah, P. 337) as Nouri Al-Sa’eed was the 
first supporter of Dallas’ idea of “Northern Sector Collective Defense” (Al-Sa'eed, P. 107). 
He made a visit to Cairo and London to discuss the American initiative, and in Egypt, Nouri 
Al-Sa’eed explained the importance of that alliance for Iraq, in which he had a friendly 
meeting with Egyptian President, Abdulnassir.  
The Egyptian leadership showed a political courtesy and not an official stand. Nouri 
Al-Sa’eed confirmed the Egyptian understanding of the Iraqi Justifications of taking part in 
the alliance (Eden, PP. 108, 147-148)
.
 Then, Nouri Al-Sa’eed visited London and on his way 
home, he visited Turkey where he met the Turkish Prime Minister and agreed upon all the 
items of the agreement (Al-Sa'eed, P. 78). On 12 January, 1955, Adnan Mandress, Prime 
Minister of Turkey, visited Baghdad, where he stated that Turkey and Iraq signed a military 
agreement which aimed at achieving co-operation and security stability  in the Middle East, 
and he asked the Arabic governments to join it (Daradkah, P. 78). Later, Britain, Pakistan and 
Iran joined the alliance (Al-Tarawneh, PP 149-150). The United States of America sent 
observers to take part in the meetings without joining the alliance (Al-Sa'eed, PP. 109-110). 
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 In signing Baghdad Alliance, Iraq faced opposition led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
Abdulanssir found in it a threat to the role of the Arab League (Al-Tarawneh, P. 151), and 
consequently, the leading role of Egypt in the Arabic region (Mahmoud, 1999, P. 540) 
 So, Egypt called for a meeting of the heads of Arab countries on January 22, 1955, 
with the aim of maintaining the Arabic status of Egypt, politically isolating Iraq and 
mobilizing Arabic opposition against the alliance and Iraq. It also aimed at preventing the 
Arab countries from joining the alliance. However, the Arab leaders did not agree upon a 
conclusion statement (Daradkeh, P. 78), and the meeting did not reach an agreement about 
what Egypt wanted (Abdulfattah, P. 336). So, Egypt followed another way against the 
alliance through its broadcast and press (Al-Majali, 2009, P.153), saying that the alliance was 
a colonial project which did not serve but the interests of the West (Abdulfattah, PP. 337-
339) and that it pushed the Arab countries in the cold war between the Western and Eastern 
Camps (Al-Majali, P. 153), in a way that put the Arab countries in danger in case of the 
breakout of war between both camps 
(26),
 and that it would lead to the Waste of Palestine 
(Nuseibah, 1990, P.41). 
 Through this way, Egypt was able to attract the public opinion and provoke it against 
governments as happened in Jordan after the visit of Templer the chief of staff of British 
armies (Al-Tarawneh, P. 151). So, on 20 October, 1955, Egypt signed a bilateral military 
agreement with Syria and then with Saudi Arabia on 27 October, 1955. On 11 March, 1956, 
the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria issued a statement in which they confirmed their 
commitment to non-alliance, and that defending the Arab world should be from within the 
Arab world and not through foreign alliances, which could be considered as treason to the 
Arab cause in general, and Palestine cause, in particular
(29)
. On 21 April, 1956, the leaders of 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a charter of collective defense (Abdulfattah, PP. 340-
341), and Egypt signed a military agreement with Jordan on May 5, 1956. Egypt believed that 
Saudi Arabia played an important and effective role in persuading the United States not to 
join the alliance (Al-Hadrami, P. 21) because they had close relations. Egypt thought that the 
alliance presented several privileges to Iraq, the fact which could reinforce its position and 
increase its superiority to Egypt (Al-Suweidi, P.554). 
 
Jordanian Stand Toward Baghdad Alliance:  
Jordan played a prominent role in the Arab region in spite of its small size and 
scarcity of potentials, especially in regard to the Palestinian Cause. Its great role was evident 
in protecting parts of Palestine. So, many Arab countries did not like this role (Al-Madhi, 
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1988, P. 534), especially after the unity of the two Banks in 1950, the fact which made 
several Arab countries deny this role. They considered the West Bank as an advantage to 
Jordan, refusing to accept the fact that it was a burden which the other Arab countries did not 
bear its responsibility (Abu Nuwwar, 1990, P. 215). One of the most important difficulties 
was the confrontation of the repeated Israeli aggressions against the villages and people of the 
West Bank, besides the burden of hosting more than a half million Palestinian refugees who 
were forced to emigrate from their land (Al-Madhi, PP. 583-594). It is no exaggeration to say 
that the Arabs were busy in their conflicts and disputes instead of the Palestinian Cause and 
their Israeli enemy. They were not concerned about strengthening themselves against their 
enemies who were supported by the West. In light of those hardships which faced Jordan in 
the West Bank, Baghdad Alliance came to increase Jordan’s hardships by putting it in the 
Middle of Arab leadership conflicts led by Egypt. 
 Since the first day of declaring the alliance, Nouri Al-Sa’eed, Iraqi Prime Minister did 
his best to convince Jordan to join it (Daradkeh, P.82), and Britain did the same promising to 
support the Jordanian state in the region, besides benefiting from the financial, economic and 
military aids offered to the countries of the region by the Western Countries to face the Soviet 
Union (Rubins, 2004, P. 92). 
 It seems that joining the alliance was a temptation to Jordan, because it could enable it 
to modify the treaty and lessen its period with the continuity of financial and defensive aids, 
especially after the failure of Jordanian- British negotiations in regard to modifying the treaty 
between the two countries (Al-Majali, P. 152), besides the possibility of increasing the 
number of Jordanian armed forces in men and weapons, getting a number of modern air 
fighters, providing money to advance Jordan’s industrial and agricultural economy and get 
rid of the British domination over the leadership of the army (Nuseibah, P. 41). Britain 
proposed to Jordan the modification of Jordanian- British treaty, provision of arms, including 
a number of free air fighters (Eden, PP. 122, 124)
 
and increasing financial aid to Jordan 
(Nuseibah, P. 102). 
 
 During the period which followed the endorsement of the alliance between Iraq and 
Turkey, the Jordanian cabinet welcomed that agreement. But Jordanian government took a 
moderate stand with all Arab countries and sought to help Iraq to have close relations with 
other Arab countries and end disputes. Meanwhile, Iraq strongly wanted Jordan to join 
Baghdad Alliance (Eden, P 123). However, Jordanian Prime Minister, Tawfeeq Abulhuda, 
and his minister for foreign affairs, Waleed Salah, were not biased to Iraq in the conference 
of the Heads of Arab Governments which was called for by Egypt. But the Jordanian 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs attacked Iraq and asked for ousting it from the Arab League, 
after the return of Jordanian Prime Minister, Tawfeeq Abulhuda, to Jordan, in a way that 
contradicted with the opinion of his government. His view was faced by disagreement from 
Awni Abdulhadi, the other member of the Jordanian delegate. The same happened by both 
Syrian and Iraqi envoys. Then Jordanian Prime Minister issued strict instructions of opposing 
any sanctions that might be taken against Iraq (Al-Majali, P.154). Hazza’ Al-Majali- a 
politician and a Jordanian Prime Minister at the time of Baghdad Alliance- hinted that 
Waleed Salah’s stand came as a result of the non-response of the Iraqi charge’ d’affaires to 
Waleed Salah’s demand of support. However, support did not come from Iraq, but from 
Saudi Arabia. Hazza’ Al-Majali stated that this stand was hinted by Abulhuda himself as 
Waleed Salah told him. Strong relations linked Abulhuda to Saudi Arabia ( Al-Majali, P. 
154).  
 After that, the Jordanian government held several meetings to determine its stand 
toward the alliance. It was decided to explore the views of Britain and the United States about 
the benefits that could be obtained from joining the alliance. So, the ambassadors of Turkey, 
Britain and the United States were called to know the views of their governments (Al-
Tarawneh, P 152). But Abulhuda’s opposition against Baghdad Alliance and the accusations 
of his relations with Saudi Arabia resulted in the resignation of his government on 28 May, 
1955 (Al-Bashayrah, P. 153). Sa’eed Al-Mufti formed a government which was described as 
coming to make Jordan join Baghdad Alliance. Al-Mufti Government encountered the 
accusation of treason from Saudi Arabia (Al-Tarawneh, P. 153) and it was attacked by the 
Saudi government represented in its ambassador in Amman, Al-Sheikh Al-Kuheimi ( Al-
Majali, PP. 160-161). 
 During this period, King Hussein visited Britain and presented his country’s demands 
which concentrated on increasing financial aid, arming the army and providing Jordan with 
airfighters. Britain promised to fulfill the Jordanian demand after conducting talks between 
the two countries to examine the developments which happened in the region and in order to 
make Jordan join Baghdad Alliance (Al-Majali, P. 161). 
 Also, the president of Turkish Republic, Jalal Bayar, visited Jordan on 2 October, 
1955 with the aim of practicing pressure on Jordan and pushing it to join the alliance. Bayar 
met Jordanian officials who presented Jordan’s financial and military needs (Eden, P. 161). 
King Hussein replied that Jordan was in need for money because it was a poor country, but 
Bayar apologized saying that Turkey was undergoing a fierce economic crisis and he said that 
Jordan should write to Britain to increase its financial aid and that Turkey would support that 
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demand (Daradkah, PP. 87-88). Bayar expressed the readiness of the Turkish army to help 
the Jordanian army in case of any aggression against Jordan. It is noticeable that King 
Hussein was trying to obtain as much as possible of weapons and aifighters in return for 
Jordan’s joining the alliance (Al-Bashayrah, P.79). Negotiations ended with the agreement of 
Jordan to join the alliance (Abdulfattah, P. 360), but Bayar’s visit was not welcomed by 
Jordanian people because of Turkey’s relations with Israel (Al-Majali, P. 167). Following 
Jalal Bayar’s visit, the Jordanian Government wrote to Britain asking for its financial and 
military demands, referring to its readiness to join the alliance (Abdulfattah, P. 360). Things 
went further when Nouri Al-Sa’eed and Jalal Bayar met in Baghdad with the Jordanian 
Ambassador, Farhan Shbeilat and asked him to convey a message to King Hussein promising 
to provide Jordan with weapons and economic aid, besides British aids (Eden, PP. 361-362). 
Iraq put the condition of joining Baghdad Alliance on Jordan when it sent a delegate asking 
for a loan from Iraq. When the Jordanian delegate refused any conditions, the Iraqis gave 
Jordan a loan of a million and six hundred thousand JDs to finance some projects that Jordan 
demanded the loan for (Al-Majali, PP. 167-168). 
 Late in 1955, Chief of Staff of the British Army came to discuss the issue and 
persuade the Jordanian leadership to join the alliance talking about military, political and 
financial gains (Daradkah, PP. 93-94). It seems that Jordan decided to accept the alliance 
pushed by the many temptations offered, the most important of which were summarized by 
Hazza’ Al-Majali in a statement to the Jordanian people then (Al-Majali, PP. 168-169):  
 
1- Jordan’s need to shorten and modify the British-Jordanian Treaty from 12 years to 
four years, namely, getting rid of the British domination sooner. 
2- Increasing the number of Jordanian military forces and obtaining new weapons and 
constant finance of the army. 
3- Jordan’s obtaining financial and economic aids to establish projects. 
4- Liberation of the Arab army from the British leadership in four years. 
 
 It seems that Jordan was encouraged to take a decision of joining Baghdad Alliance as 
it would bring great benefits, the most important of which was the liberation of Jordanian 
Army from the British military domination, besides the financial and military aids which 
would enhance the capabilities of the Arab Jordanian Army in facing the Israeli enemy and 
increase the economic potentials of Jordan, taking into account that the Arab Countries did 
not show any initiative of supporting and helping Jordan to encounter its problems and 
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concerns (Nuseibah, P. 41). What has already been mentioned formed gains to Jordanian 
political officials like Hazza’ Al-Majali. 
 In the period which preceded Templer’s visit to Jordan, Abdul Hakeem Aamir 
(General Commander of the Egyptian Army) visited Jordan where he read Jordan’s note to 
the Turkish government and the demands included. He praised what it included and conveyed 
a copy to president Jamal Abdulnassir. Templer’s visit to Jordan was contemporary with 
Anwar Al-Sadat’s visit to it (he was a minister of state during the period of the Egyptian 
Revolution) who did not object to the Jordanian-British negotiations and suggested that 
Jordan should get the help of Egyptian experts to determine the type of arms demanded in 
return for joining the alliance (Al-Majali, P. 170). 
 But Templer’s negotiations failed after meeting all Jordanian ministers. Some of them 
circulated the negotiations with Templer to the Jordanian people, the fact which aroused 
rumors. During that period, thirty representatives petitioned the Minister of Public work, 
Na’eem Abdulhadi, then, in order to present him a motion of “no confidence”. So, this 
minister provoked the ministers of the West Bank to resign, in order to get out of that critical 
situation, using the negotiations for joining Baghdad Alliance as an excuse for claiming that 
Baghdad’s charter will harm the Palestinian cause and that the resignation of the ministers 
came for the sake of Jordan (Eden, P. 125). 
 The Jordanian ministers split in their views about the note which determined the 
Jordanian demands that would be presented to Templer. The ministers of the West Bank, 
Headed by Awni Abdulhadi wanted the note to be examined by Egypt before being examined 
by Britain lest it should include any negligence of the Palestinian cause. This led to the 
failure of negotiations and resignation of the West Bank Ministers (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 90-
91). Templer did his best to assure the ministers and Jordanian government that Baghdad 
Alliance would not affect the Palestinian cause, but his efforts failed
(64)
. Al-Mufti government 
resigned (Al-Majali, PP. 170-171) and Hazza’ Al-Majali formed the government in a period 
which witnessed confusion and the Jordanian public opinion was full of a group of thoughts, 
the most important of which was the belief that the talks with Templer were the way that 
would lead to the waste of Palestine and its cause. The role which Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
played contributed in provoking the Jordanian street, besides what has already been 
mentioned in regard to the circulations of the ministers of Al-Mufti government and their 
resignations (Eden, P. 171). Anwar Al-Sadat, during his visit to Jordan, contemporary with 
Templer’s visit, tried to express a different view which was provocative against the alliance, 
especially during his tour in Amman and Jerusalem, besides the Saudi money which played a 
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role in weakening Al-Mufti Government (Al-Tarawnah, P. 157). Anthony Eden stated that he 
was worried about the reactions of the Jordanian street which were affected by the Egyptian 
propaganda and Saudi money (Eden, P. 122). Moreover, Jordanian parties, with their 
different thoughts, played an important role in opposing the alliance. This started with the 
visit of Turkish President, Bayar, to Jordan when the parties organized demonstrations and 
marches against the visit and his efforts to join Jordan to the alliance (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 92-
93). 
 During this period, Hazza’ Al-Majali formed his government with the aim of 
maintaining Jordan’s interests, trying to obtain other gains through the negotiations of joining 
the alliance. This happened through the economic and military conditions of Jordan (Al-
Majali, PP. 176-178). Hazza’ had a condition that Templer should return to his country 
during the formation of his government and Templer returned to Britain (Al-Majali, P. 172). 
 The Egyptian Arabs’ Voice Broadcast played a role in provoking the Jordanian Street 
with rumors (Al-Bashayrah, P. 108), especially when the Egyptian government tried to fail 
the alliance. So, the Arabs’ Voice Broadcast spread out rumors that there were 
demonstrations and clashes between the two sides: the government and people which resulted 
in deaths and injuries.  
 Ali Abu Nuwwar stated that the army tried to repress the demonstrations, but it failed. 
Abu Nuwwar lessened the role of Egyptian information in provoking demonstrations saying 
that the reason was the awareness of Jordanian people (Abu Nuwwar, P. 161). Hazza’ Al-
Majali tried to contain the demonstrations and refused to repress them by force (Al-Majali, 
PP. 172-173), as they were comprehensive and included all Jordanian cities and villages in 
both Banks (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 96-97). He sought to find a democratic solution through the 
parliament, but the people did not trust the way of choosing the council (Al-Majali, PP. 172-
173). When Hazza’ Al-Majali failed to reach a solution with the continuity of Protests 
(Abdulfattah, P. 361), great opposition against the government and Baghdad Alliance (Al-
Bashayrah, PP. 98-99), spread out violence, resulted in a number of dead people and the 
resignation of three ministers from his government, he resigned just after less than a week of 
his government formation (Al-Tarawnah, P. 158). He requested the King to dissolve the 
Parliament and it was dissolved (Al-Majali, PP. 172-174). It is noticeable that the Arabs’ 
Voice Broadcast had its clear role in provoking the Jordanian Street to move against its 
government. Moreover, the Saudi money had a role in tempting a lot of people to oppose the 
policy of Jordanian government, as well as the role of Jordanian parties and the awareness of 
people in the eruption of the demonstrations against Hazza’s government. 
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 In spite of the formation of a new government by Ibraheem Hashim, demonstrations 
continued in Jordanian cities. In this period, the higher council of the constitution gave its 
opinion of the illegality of dissolving the Parliament. So, Hashim’s government was 
dissolved and the parliament was reinstituted. Then Sameer Al-Rifa’i formed his government 
and took some measures to prevent demonstrations and control the state of disorder. 
 The government declared a state of emergency in the country and curfew was 
imposed. The army took charge of gathering arms from cities and villages, a lot of people 
were arrested or imprisoned or exiled (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 104-105). Jordan asked for the help 
of Britain which sent two battalions to Jordan. King Hussein asked Britain to be an 
intermediary with Iraqi government in order to send reinforcements from the Iraqi army to 
help in restoring stability in Jordan (Daradkah, P. 100). It is important to mention that Jordan, 
after the formation of the government by Sameer Al-Rifa'i started to move away from the 
special thoughts of Baghdad Alliance (Al-Majali, P. 181) when Al-Rifa'i stated that the 
government’s policy was not to join any new alliance (Al-Bashayrah, P. 105). King Hussein 
addressed the Jordanian people declaring that Jordan would not give up its strife and support 
of Palestinian people to return to their homeland (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 105-106). This shows 
that the Jordanian leadership as a king and a people abandoned all the gains that would be 
obtained from Baghdad Alliance. This happened for the sake of maintaining the unity in 
stand between leadership and people. To keep Jordan away from intrigue and state of 
political and security disorder and belief that Jordan's joining Baghdad Alliance would create 
a state of tension that might be exploited by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, the fact which 
could affect the internal security and stability of Jordan (Al-Tarawnah, P. 155), especially in 
light of the state of Arabic controversy and dispute.  
 During that period, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria proposed an offer of providing a 
financial aid instead of the British aid to the Jordanian army which was (12.5) million sterling 
pounds (Abu Nuwwar, P. 162), with the aim of lessening the British domination over Jordan 
(Al-Majali, P. 181). In this period, Al-Rifa'i sought to clarify his government's policy to the 
Arab countries through his visits to many of them, talking about his government's opposition 
to alliances' policy, and that it wanted to have friendly relations and friendship with all 
countries without any exception, and his government would follow a non-allied policy in its 
relations with Egypt and Iraq. But in spite of all the efforts and political statements of Al-
Rifa'i's government, Egypt was not satisfied. The Egyptian and Syrian broadcasts continued 
in their attack against Al-Rifa'i's government, because Egypt did not want Jordan to be non-
allied in dealing with Iraq, but to take an opposing stand against it (Eden, P. 182). So, Egypt 
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sought to create a state of tension and suspicion about Jordanian army be distributing leaflets 
which carried the signatures of Free Officers, distributed by the Egyptian military attaché in 
Jordan and his provocation of rebellion (Abu Nuwwar, PP. 163-164). It is worthwhile to refer 
back to Abu Nuwwar's statement because it presented a contemporary narration of a person 
close to the events of the period of the study. He was one of the superior officers in Jordan 
and a military escort of King Hussein Bin Talal and he was chief of the Jordanian Army after 
Arabization. 
 Egypt went further than that when it made Jordan in its greatest worry of constant 
clashes with Israel though the work of its intelligence in the West Bank when it recruited 
young people in order to carry out operations against Israel, in an attempt to occupy Jordan in 
fierce confrontations with it. Meanwhile, Egypt refused to sign any military agreement with 
Jordan in spite of Jordan's endeavors (Mahafzah, 2005, P. 200). During that period, the 
Jordanian army was Arabized by the ousting of Klobe Basha from its leadership (Abu 
Nuwwar, PP, 195, 198, 230), by a decree from King Hussein Bin Talal who criticized him for 
many things. He saw in him the domination of Britain over Jordan and the Arab region (Al-
Majali, P. 186), the thing which Britain did its best to maintain through the policy of 
alliances. 
 In the same year, the tri-aggression was launched on Egypt by Israel, France and 
Britain. That aggression had the great effect of ending the British existence in the region (Al-
Shalabi, P. 172). 
 After its participation with Israel and France in the attack against Egypt, Britain 
confirmed in that all the previous charges stated by Baghdad Alliance opposers in the Arab 
Region, and that it was the first ally of Zionism as it created the Zionist existence. In that 
way, it proved again that it was a colonial state which did not seek but its influence in the 
region and being an enemy against any Arabic aspirations. 
 What confirmed this view was Hazza' Al-Majali’s statement, who was one of the 
greatest advocates of joining Baghdad Alliance, that Britain in its participation in the tri-
aggression committed a great stupidity by taking the side of Israel. It passed up its wide 
interests in the Arab region and made its Arab friends abandon it and leave its support (Al-
Majali, P. 204). This confirms the weakness of the Arabic political memory and the non-
existence of a real Arabic conception of dealing with the West. 
Jordan announced its support of Egypt during the tri-aggression. After the war, 
Jordan's demands of Arabic aid were renewed when a Jordanian representative in Parliament 
asked the Arab countries for financial aid, the fact which aroused Syria's grudge and its 
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ambassador in Jordan, who described this demand as embarrassing for both Syria and Egypt, 
and that they were incapable of responding to it. It was said that the idea of the financial aid 
to Jordan was a kind of threat to Britain in order not to exploit Jordan's need for financial aid 
and impose its will on it (Eden, P. 207). This confirms the fact that the Arab countries were 
not serious in offering the Arabic aid to Jordan.  
 It seems that this talk about the negligence of British aid to Jordan made Britain 
enquire about the stand of Jordanian government toward the abolishment of Jordanian-British 
Treaty, and the Jordanian government wanted to make sure of the Arab countries’ promises 
to offer a financial aid instead of the British aid, taking into account that the abolishment of 
the treaty with Britain meant stopping its aid to Jordan, which was badly needed. Therefore, a 
Jordanian delegate went to Egypt which agreed upon the aid to Jordan, its amount, payment 
way and the share of each country, Saudi Arabia announced its agreement about what was 
achieved in Egypt. Finally, the delegate visited Syria on 19 January 1957. King Saud, 
President Abdulnassir and President Al-Kuwatli met when they signed the treaty of Arab 
solidarity which confirmed the commitment of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria to pay the 
financial aid to Jordan, the amount of which was (12.5) million sterling pounds ( Daradkah, 
PP. 136-137). That was followed by Jordan negotiating Britain to end the Jordanian- British 
Treaty and it was ended on 13 February, 1957 (Al-Tarawnah, PP. 164-165). 
 
The Saudi Stand Toward Baghdad Alliance: 
The Institution of an alliance in the region led by Iraq was not appealing to many 
Arab countries. Each one of them had its own justifications and incentives, but they 
combined in one common stand and one aim, namely, failing and overthrowing Baghdad 
Alliance. Therefore, the Egyptian stand was corresponding with the Saudi’s toward Baghdad 
Alliance despite the difference in political systems. Saudi Arabia, from the beginning, took an 
opposing position, rejecting any attempts to institute alliances led by the Iraqi government. It 
seems that certain factors and justifications made Saudi Arabia take this stand, work with 
Egypt against the alliance and do its best to fail it in spite of the friendly relations which 
linked Saudi Arabia to the United States, the initiative and supportive country of the alliance. 
One of the most prominent factors of the alliance of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in confronting 
Iraq and Baghdad Alliance was the hostility between the two families: the Saudis and the 
Hashemites, which was dated back to the events that the Arabian Peninsula witnessed during 
the Ottoman rule and after. The Arabian Peninsula witnessed a conflict between the chiefs of 
tribes on power which mounted to a military confrontation between the Sherif of Mecca and 
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Saudi family. This conflict was ended by the triumph and control of Al-Hijaz by Ibn Saud 
(Al-Suweidi, P. 539).  
Therefore, the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not friendly (Abu 
Nuwwar, P. 263) but they were hostile (Morris, P. 191) despite the many agreements signed 
which stated good neighborhood and the endeavors of successive Iraqi governments to 
improve the relations between the two countries, but they all failed (Abdulfattah, P. 353). The 
reason was the Saudi opposing stand against the Iraqi calls for the Iraqi-Syrian Unity (Eden, 
P.353), and its call for unity with Jordan since the beginnings of the fifties of the last century 
before the institution of Baghdad Alliance (Al-Hadhrami, P. 21). The Iraqi ambitions were 
the reason for the Saudi Protest (Al-Shalabi, P. 117), for fear of the institution of a strong 
state for the Hashemites on the Northern borders of Saudi Arabia, which would call again for 
restoring Al-Hijaz that the Saudis controlled and annexed to their State in 1925 (Ibn Sa'ud, 
PP. 4-6). King Abdulazeez sent a message to Britain, asking for practicing pressure on Iraq’s 
Prince regent to prevent him from interfering in Jordan (Al-Shalabi, P. 117). The Saudi 
opposing policy against Baghdad Alliance continued after the appointment of King Saud Bin 
Abdulzeez following the passing by of King Abdulazeez. 
In spite of all that, the United States and Britain did their best to join Saudi Arabia to 
Baghdad Alliance under several justifications, one of which was the threat of some Gulf 
countries, like Iran, to Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia had its vision and opposing stand 
rejecting the alliance. It stood by Egypt and supported it in its opposition. We can say that 
this support played an efficient role in failing the project of Baghdad Alliance. Saudi Arabia’s 
opposition against Baghdad Alliance started earlier during the period of negotiations when it 
issued a statement on 18 January, 1954 in which it supported the opposing stand of Egypt 
against Baghdad Alliance (Abdulfattah, PP. 353-354). This was followed by King Saud 
Abdulazeez’s address to the Arab Nation that it was tested in its precious thing, namely, the 
Arab League, and that one of its countries (he meant Iraq) departed its unanimous resolution. 
He also sent a message to Nouri Al-Sa’eed warning him of taking an isolated stand that could 
affect the Arab Unity. He stated that Iraq acted badly to the Arab Unity (Daradkah, PP. 102-
103). 
Saudi Arabia took the side of Egypt in the conference of Arab Prime ministers where 
its complete support of the Egyptian stand appeared through the statement of Prince Faissal 
Bin Abdulazeez: “I believe that this alliance is the beginning not the end and the cause of the 
destruction of Arab countries (Abdulfattah, P. 354). It is noticed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
confirmed the importance of maintaining the Arab League as being the best form which 
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represented the concepts of Arab Unity that they did not want to go out of its frame, the fact 
which could affect and threaten the Arabic position of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, especially 
when things were related to the stand and status of the Hashemites and their influence and the 
elevation of international and regional status of Iraq, the fact which threatened the Saudi 
interests. 
Besides the hostilities of Saudi Arabia against the Hashemites in Iraq (Al-Suweidi, P. 
539), there were hostilities against Britain which took an opposing stand against Saudi Arabia 
in the conflict about the rich oil Braimy Oasis in 1954 (Eden, PP. 110-111). As a result, Saudi 
Arabia had close relations with the United States of America which were connected with 
common interests since the thirties of the twentieth century (Al-Auteibi, No. 14571, May 16, 
2008). Saudi Arabia began to drift away from British policy after its role had become 
secondary (Al-Tarawnah, P. 153). 
For these reasons, Saudi Arabia took its stand against its two enemies, namely, Iraq 
and Britain to face this project strongly and fail it. This was farnkly stated by British Prime 
minister, then, Anthony Eden (Eden, PP. 106, 110). 
It held an opposing alliance  with Egypt and spent lots of money in Syria and Jordan 
and gave bribes to officials to group opposition against Baghdad Alliance (Al-Tarawnah, P. 
153). Saudi Arabia and Egypt took roles in their actions. Egypt worked by propaganda and 
intelligence, while Saudi Arabia worked through money which was described by Iraqi 
ambassador in Saudi Arabia, then, Ameen Al-Mumeiz as the diplomacy of gold (Al-
Tarawnah, P. 153). Saudi Arabia bought some newspapers to announce its opposing stand 
against the alliance and consider joining it as a treason of Palestinian cause (Daradkah, PP. 
104-105). The Saudi influence seemed strong in Jordan through its ambassador Abdulazeez 
Al-Kuheimi who had close relations with a lot of Jordanian politicians. He played an 
important role in solving political disputes which lasted for several years between Abu Al-
Huda and Sameer Al-Rifa’i in an attempt to establish a unified Jordanian front that would be 
supporting Saudi Arabia and opposing Baghdad Alliance (Al-Majali, P. 159). Saudi Arabia 
paid monthly amounts of money to Abu Al-Huda's government (Daradkah, P. 84) in the same 
way as it paid for three of Al-Majali's ministers to fail Templer's efforts of making Jordan 
join the alliance (Eden, P. 101). 
The Iraqi documents issued by the Iraqi commissariat in Amman on October, 1955 
stated that the Saudis spent large amounts of  money for recruiting Palestinian refugees in 
Syria, by cooperation with Egypt in order to infiltrate to Israel, and Jordan was suspicious of 
the possibility of secret aims in Jordan (Al-Tarawnah, PP. 153-154). The document stated 
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that Abu Al-Huda, after returning from Saudi Arabia, got lots of money that were deposited 
in Beirut, and that he made contacts with Jordanian opposition in Damascus with the aim of 
coordinating the work of the opposition against the policy calling for Baghdad Alliance 
which was based on the policy of King Hussein and Al-Mufti government. The document 
added that the Saudis increased their propaganda following King Saud Bin Abdulazeez's visit 
to Jordan, when donations were distributed to charity societies in Jordan. The amount of 
money paid by the Saudi embassy was about thirty thousand JDs in one month, the fact 
which led to dismissing the Saudi ambassador, Al-Kuheimi, from Jordan in November, 1955 
(Eden, P. 154), especially after his several attempts to confront and embarrass Al-Mufti 
government. This was apparent after the protest note sent by him when Sherif Nassir 
performed prayer in the memory of the Palestinian martyrs who were executed in Saudi 
Arabia following their coup attempt (Al-Majali, P. 160). 
On September 5, 1955, King Hussein visited Saudi Arabia escorted by his mother 
Queen Zain Al-Sharaf and his uncle Sherif Nassir Bin Jameel. It seems that this visit came to 
soften the climates with Saudi Arabia after the dismissal of the Saudi Ambassador Al-
Kuheimi, and to ask for financial aid to Jordan (Al-Tarawnah, P. 154). 
After that, Saudi Arabia tried to be close to Jordan through the invitation of a number 
of Arab countries to a conference in Riyadh. This conference which was called Riyadh 
Conference was held in 1956 in which Saudi Arabia offered its share of the Arabic aid that 
was 250,000 JDs (Abu Nuwwar, PP. 212-214). Following the abolishment of the Jordanian-
British Treaty, Saudi Arabia paid its share of the financial aid which was five million sterling 
pounds. On the other hand, both Egypt and Syria did not fulfill their financial commitments 
to Jordan which they promised in the Arab Solidarity Agreement, the fact that led to the 
deterioration of the financial situation in Jordan after the cut-off of the British aid (Daradkah, 
P. 142). This was the last amount of the Arab aid offered to Jordan. 
Saudi Arabia was one of the most important countries which supported Jordan and 
was committed to paying its share of the financial aid to it after signing the Arab Solidarity 
Agreement with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. It seems that Saudi Arabia started to 
play a new role by the new influence of the United States of America in the region in place of 
Britain which lost its influence after Jordan's abolishment of its treaty.  
Saudi Arabia worked for the success of Eisenhower Project by practicing pressure on 
the Arab countries like Jordan through the breaking of already agreed upon commitments, 
and linking any aid by the agreement upon the American Project. In light of its financial 
crisis, Jordan was obliged to join Eisenhower's Project, aiming at solving its financial 
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problems which resulted from the Arabs' breaking their promises of help and support, 
disregarding the fact that the project will bring Jordan under the umbrella of American 
domination in place of British domination. 
For the importance and effect of Saudi money in confronting the alliance in the Arab 
region, British Prime Minister (Eden, PP. 110, 123, 111), Anthony Eden asked the United 
States to interfere in persuading the Saudis to invest their money in a more beneficial way for 
themselves instead of using it in fighting the British Policy in the Arab region (Eden, PP11, 
123). This urged Nouri Al-Sa'eed to ask the United Stated not to pay for the purchases of 
Saudi oil for six months at least. Had the United States agreed to do that, things would have 
changed in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt and that would have led to an Arabic-Israeli 
settlement (Eden, PP. 123-124). This confirms the fact that Saudi Arabia paid abundant 
amounts of money to stir up disturbance with the aim of having pressure on Jordanian 
government, exploiting the bad financial conditions of Palestinian refugees and tempting 
them with money to carry out disturbance ( Al-Tarawnah, P. 159). 
A confidential report was sent to prime minister Anthony Eden by British Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Yumak Harold Macmilan about Baghdad Alliance Conference. It was dated 
25 January, 1955 in which the British minister criticized the Saudi Policy by saying: "the 
important point which emerged clearly from what I heard in Baghdad and Beirut is that the 
situation in the Middle East is undergoing destruction and corruption via the Saudi money 
(Abu Shakra, No. 10428, 17 June, 2007)". 
American historian George Linshovisky explained that the fierce opposition 
expressed by King Saud against the alliance reflected his fear that the Hashemites would 
avenge the defeat which happened to them thirty years ago, and so came the Saudi reaction. 
This is confirmed in the statement of American ambassador in Jiddah: "King Saud feels that 
Baghdad Alliance was just a British conspiracy implemented by Nouri Al-Sa'eed to 
overthrow the Saudi throne and remove Al-Hijaz (Al-Mumeiz, PP. 590-591)". 
It appears from what has already been mentioned that the effect of the Egyptian-Saudi 
opposition was efficient. It was able to eliminate the project of Baghdad Alliance and prevent 
the Arab countries from joining it and to be completely finished after the participation of 
Britain in the aggression against Egypt. That participation was a confirmation that Britain 
was a colonial state working for its interests and as being the first ally of Zionism ( Morris, P. 
197) and Israel the Arabs' enemy and the usurper of their land and rights. 
It is noticeable that the United States did not join the alliance in a complete way in 
spite of the fact that it was its main moving power as being the first to initiate its idea, design 
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it and determine its general frame (Eden, P. 112). Its role was confined to the participation in 
the works of economic and military committees, and "anti-destructive action" committee. The 
United States authorized the task of leading the alliance to Britain, while planning for the 
defensive strategies of the alliance and real authority in taking important decisions remained 
in the hands of the United States (Williamson, P. 599). This stand aroused a lot of questions 
which needed different explanations, one of which was that the United States did not want to 
press Saudi Arabia to change its stand rejecting the alliance (Eden, P. 110) in order to 
maintain its relations with it
 
( Al-Hadhrami, p. 21), in spite of having all possible means of 
pressure and influence on Saudi Arabia, with its capability to give sufficient guaranties that 
would eliminate fears. In spite of all the reasons that have already been mentioned, it seems 
that the United States did not take part in the alliance as it believed it would form a threat to 
Israel. It would strengthen the military potentials of Arab countries ( Nuseibah, PP. 41-42). 
This reason would not give a logical analysis, because the aids offered to participating 
countries in the alliance were limited. They would not change the balance of power to the 
advantage of Arab countries. But the truth lied in different reasons because the United States 
wanted to explore and examine political and social situations in the Arab region and its stand 
in regard to alliances with Western countries after the appearance of an anti-west Arab 
movement (Abdulfattah, PP. 333-336). So, it considered achieving what it aspired for without 
the possibility of failure by leaving the leadership of the alliance project to Britain. The 
United States was aware of the weak political and diplomatic potentials of Britain in 
persuading the Arab countries to join the alliance, taking into account that its picture was 
deformed for its role in the institution of Zionist existence in Palestine, besides its bad 
relations with some countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
This American stand against British policy was clear when the United Stated objected 
to the tri-aggression on Egypt and through its pressure on Britain to force it to stop the 
aggression ( Nating, Issue 2, 1993, PP. 212-213, 215,219). In all that, it sought to end British 
existence to be a substitute for it in the region. We should not disregard the role of the Cold 
War between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Propaganda against Baghdad 
Alliance and its failing (Nuseibah, P. 41). The Soviet Union sought to support the Arab 
national thought against the west and its projects by strengthening its commercial and 
military relations with Egypt and Syria, especially after the agreements of arms deals with 
Egypt in 1955 (Mahafzah, P. 202). 
We do not exaggerate when we say that the United States sought to fail Britain in that 
project and leave it to strife for its success in spite of the effective means the United States 
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had for exercising pressure on the Arabic opposition (Eden, P. 112), the most important of 
which was the ability to fail the Egyptian-Saudi alliance which was the most influential one 
(Abu Nuwwar, P. 263). However, the subsequent events confirmed the fact that the aim of 
the United States was not the alliance, but the failing of Britain and driving it away from the 
Arab region and replacing it (Al-Shalabi, PP. 160, 163). The United States realized the 
strategic and economic importance of the region as it had two thirds of the oil reserve in the 
world (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 152, 161). 
The United States accomplished its aim by instituting Eisenhower Project in 1957 
which came to fill in the gap after the retreat of British influence in the region, and the pledge 
to protect participating countries (Al-Tarawnah, P. 166), and offer financial and military aids 
to them. So, the United States was able to be a substitute for Britain. 
 
Conclusion: 
 The investigation of Arabic stand toward Baghdad Alliance reveals a lot of the 
features of Arabic policy then. The project started as an American-British one, through which 
the Western countries sought to confront the Soviet influence by increasing their influence in 
the Arab region and providing financial and military temptations to the Arab countries. 
 Some Arab countries responded to that project, the first of which was Iraq. In that 
alliance, Iraq found a way for strengthening its political and military influence in the Arab 
region in order to compete with great Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In 
addition, the alliance placed Iraq in an important and high position at international and 
regional levels. That is why Iraq did its best for the success of Baghdad Alliance Project in 
order to urge the other Arab countries to join it, especially Jordan which had close family 
relationships with it. Iraq was careful about Jordan's joining the alliance in order to be split 
and isolated from the Arabs. Iraq's attempts, then Turkey's, to persuade Jordan to join the 
alliance met a responsive reaction in spite of the reluctant non-supportive Jordanian stand 
toward the alliance from the beginning. But the economic and ,military offers presented to 
Jordan created an incentive to the Jordanian leadership represented in King Hussein Bin Talal 
and Jordanian government, taking into account that those economic and military offers were 
badly needed in order to be able to encounter the repeated Israeli aggressions. So, Jordan 
considered the alliance as an opportunity to strengthen the military potentials of its army in 
order to face the west-supported Israeli power which the Arabs were not able to encounter in 
1967 as a result of their inability to retaliate (Nuseibah, PP.41-42). This thing was not certain 
because the alliance represented the greeds of the western side which supported Israel. 
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 The alliance failed as the Arabs split between supporters and opposers. Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia opposed it and Egypt, after the revolution, represented the Arab national 
movement which sought to face the west and its greeds by refusing its domination. Egypt 
followed a non-allied policy and at the same time did its best to maintain its position as a 
leader of the Arab world, taking the excuse of the Arab League and Arab unity. Saudi Arabia 
also considered the alliance as a way of strengthening its conventional enemies in both Iraq 
and Jordan, thinking of Baghdad Alliance as a way of strengthening Iraq and Jordan, the fact 
which threatened it and its land. Moreover, Saudi Arabia did not want the Hashemites to take 
the lead of unity movement and leadership in the Arab World which was sought by King 
Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein with all means (Makkawi, PP. 244-251, 248). Saudi Arabia was not 
at ease with King Abdullah's aspirations and desires in regional expansion in the region and 
considered him a possible danger and threat to Al-Hijaz (Eden, P. 262). 
 Therefore, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to oppose Baghdad Alliance and split 
the way of work and opposition. Egypt sought to stir up the Arabic opinion and charge it with 
anti-alliance thoughts claiming that the alliance was a waste of Palestinian cause and Arab 
rights in Palestine. This was done through the Arabs' Voice Broadcast which accused 
Baghdad Alliance, Iraq and all those who supported it, to the extent that people got to the 
habit of listening to it. Al-Suweidi, in his notes, stated that people were in the habit of 
listening to the Arabs' Voice Broadcast cursing Baghdad Alliance as they ate and drank (Al-
Suwaeidi, P. 553). This indicates the power which that broadcast had and the informational 
influence against Baghdad Alliance as Hazz'a Al-Majali said, "the broadcasts opposing it 
formed an overwhelming current which could not be faced (Al-Majali, P. 174)". On the other 
hand, Saudi Arabia followed an other way which was not less important than the role of 
Egypt, namely using money for buying political views in Jordan and other countries to reject 
the alliance and to form a general opposing opinion driven by money as it happened in 
Jordan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, through propaganda and money which were able to 
constitute a strong political opposing front against Baghdad Alliance in Jordan. This action 
persuaded King Hussein and Jordanian government to abandon the idea of joining the 
alliance in spite of the significant temptations for the sake of the unity of Jordan and to avoid 
an endless intrigue. The events related to the alliance developed quickly following the 
participation of Britain in the tri-aggression on Egypt when it lost every support in the Arab 
region. The aggression was the turning point and the beginning of the end of the British 
influence in the region. After that, it lost the most important centre of its influence in Jordan 
by the Arabization of the army and the abolishment of the British-Jordanian Treaty, when the 
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Arab countries, represented in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, promised to offer a financial 
aid to Jordan which was previously offered by Britain yearly. However, these Arabic 
promises were just techniques by Saudi Arabia and Egypt to fail Britain and its allies. The 
Arab countries did not keep their commitment, except for Saudi Arabia which offered its 
share only once. That action had the most negative effect on the Arabic policy. Instead of 
supporting and containing Jordan and enhancing its independence, after  abolishing its treaty 
with Britain and resorting to the Arabs, we find that the Arab countries did not fulfill all their 
commitments, the fact which led to a dangerous financial crisis that threatened its existence. 
Moreover, those Arab countries plotted conspiracies for a military coup through Egypt by 
urging a number of Jordanian officers to do  that. Meanwhile, Jordan asked Egypt for help 
and aid (Abu Nuwwar, PP. 306, 308). In this way, intentionally or unintentionally, the Arab 
countries paved the way for the United States to enter the Arab region. Saudi Arabia really 
sought to make Jordan join Eisenhower Project. From what has already been presented, it 
seems that Baghdad Alliance revealed the Arab political shortsightedness. It confirmed the 
non-existence of a real Arab Solidarity. The matter was a conflict of power between power 
centres in the Arab countries. Moreover, the failure of Baghdad Alliance was to the 
advantage of the United States which tried to weaken it. It neglected all Britain's demands of 
support to face the Saudi opposition. By this, it failed the alliance, ended Britain in the region 
and replaced it with no effort. 
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